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the ease before ns, it s;eems clear that petitioner . . . was
not immune from service of summons." (P. 241.)
These policy considerations are controlling in the present
case. Mrs. V elkov was the moving party in the disciplinary
proceeding, which concerns the same transaction which is the
basis of the action for declaratory relief. Under such circumstances, no public interest would be served by granting
the claimed immunity.
The writ of prohibition is denied, and the alternative writ
is discharged.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., 'rraynor, J., Schauer, J.,
and Spence, J., concurred.

[Sac. No. 6309.

In Bank.

Feb. 20, 1953.]

THOMAS S. WHALEN, Appellant, v. AL RUIZ et al., Defendants; SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY (a Corporation) et al., Respondents.
[1] Easements-Mode and Extent of User-Maintenance of Easement.-Where railroad built a bridge across a river and
granted to counties which the bridge connected an easement
for use of the overhead or roadway portion of the bridge for
highway purposes, the railroad, as owner of the servient
tenement, is not obligated by the mere grant of the easement
to maintain the easement in a safe condition for the protection of those using it at the invitation of the easement owners.
[2] !d.-Mode and Extent of User-Changes.-Where railroad
built a bridge across a river and granted to counties which
the bridge connected an easement for use of the overhead or
roadway portion of the bridge for highway purposes, the
constructed curb and railing on the highway deck of the
bridge formed a part of the subject matter of the easement,
and it is not incumbent on the railroad to alter these structural features of the roadway or substitute others therefor
to accommodate the changing needs of public travel according to future development, in the absence of an agreement
[1] Right of owner of easement of way to make improvements
or repairs thereon, note, 112 A.L.R. 1303. See, also, Cal.Jur.,
Easements, § 8; Am.Jur., Easements, § 108.
McK. Dig. References: [11 Easements, § 37; [2, 8, 9] EasementA, § 29; [3, 4, 6, 7, 10] Railroads, §58; [5] Contraets, ~ 150.
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devolving such duty on the railroad as owner of the servient
tenement.
[3] Railroads-Bridges-Repairs.-Where railroad built a bridge
across a river and entered into an agreement with counties,
which the bridge connected, to "keep in repair" the overhead
or roadway portion of the bridge, the quoted words do not
require the railroad to make structural changes thereon, since
the word "repair" in its ordinary sense relates to the preservation of property in its original condition, and does not
carry the connotation that a new thing should be made or
a distinct entity created.
[4a, 4b] Id.-Bridges--Repairs.-vVhere a railroad and the eonnties with which the railroad agreed to "keep in repair" the
overhead or roadway portion of a bridge interpreted their
agreement as not imposing on the railroad the duty to make
structural changes in the highway deck of the bridge, such construction will be adopt<"d by the courts since it is not only reasonable, but a eontrary construetion would not reflect the ordinary meaning of the language used. ( Civ. Code, ~ 1644.)
[5] Contracts-Interpretation-Construction by Parties.-A construction given a contract by the acts and conduct of the
parties with knowledge of its terms, before any controversy
has arisen as to its meaning, is entitled to great weight and
will, when reasonable, be adopted and enforced by the court.
[6] Railroads-Bridges-"Operate and Police."-Where railroad
built a drawbridge across a river and entered into an agreement
with counties, which the bridge connected, to "operate and
police" the overhead or roadway portion of the bridge, the
quoted words do not require the railroad to make structural
changes on the overhead structure, since the word "operate,"
when used in connection with a drawbridge or machinery that
moves, means to "put in action and supervise the working
of," to "run."
[7) Id.-Bridges-"Operate and Police."-Where division engineer
of railroad which entered into an agreement with certain
counties to "operate and police" the overhead or roadway
portion of a drawbridge across a river testified that oYer tl;e
years of the agreement the railroad's operation of the bridge
had been confined exclusively to operation of the draw span,
such procedure indicates the parties' practical construction
of their agreement in reference to the railroad's operation of
the mechanism whidt eontrolled the nwyabh: part of the
bridge, aud, iu eouueetion with other testinwuy rPlatiug to
the railroad's clm,;ing of the gates when the bridge was about
to open and stopping the tmffic before the gate~ were closed,
[ 5] See Cal.Jur., Contracts, § 184; Am.Jur., Contraets, § 249.
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is entitled to great weight in solving the meaning of the
quoted words.
[8] Easements-Mode and Extent of User-Changes.-Since the
extent o~ervitude is determined by the terms of the grant
or the nature of the enjoyment by which it was acquired
( Civ. Code, § 806), both parties have a right to insist that
so long as the easement is enjoyed it shall remain substantially the same as it was at the time the right accrued, regardless of the question as to the relative benefit and damage
that would ensue to the parties by reason of a change in
the mode of its enjoyment.
[9] !d.-Mode and Extent of User-Changes.-Where railroad
built a bridge across a river and granted to counties which
the bridge connected an easement for use of the overhead
or roadway portion of the bridge for highway purposes, and
the state, some 14 years thereafter, entered into an agreement
with the railroad and counties whereby the state undertook
to make all necessary changes in the overhead structure, such
agreement demonstrates that the state had knowledge of
the prior agreement between the railroad and the counties
as to the nature of ~sement granted and secured their
consent before undertaking to alter the manner of its use
and enjoyment. (Civ. Code, § 806.)
[10] Railroads-Bridges-Maintenance and Repairs.-In view of
statutory provisions that the State Department of Public
Works shall have full possession and control of all state
highways and is directed to improve and maintain such highways and to do any act necessary or proper for the improvement, maintenance or control of all highways under
its control (Sts. & Hy. Code, § 100), and that the degree
and type of maintenance for each highway shall be determined by the state agency ( Sts. & Hy. Code, § 27), the state,
and not the railroad which built a bridge across a river with
the overhead or roadway portion to be used by the adjoining
counties for highway purposes, would have authority to make
structural changes in the highway deck of the bridge and
would be chargeable with the undertaking of appropriate
safety measures pursuant to its maintenance of the state
highway system.

APPEAl_; from portion of a judgment of the Superior
Court of Sacramento County. B. F. Van Dyke, Judge. Affirmed.
Aetion for damages for personal injuries sustained by passenger of autobus when it ran off a bridge maintained by defendant railroad company. Part of judgment that plaintiff
take nothing against defendant railroad, affirmed.
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Mull & Pierce, A. M. Mull, ,Jr., Fred Pierce and Benjamin
II. Brown for Appellant.
Devlin, Diepenbrock & Wulff and Horace B. Wulff for Respondents.
SPENCE, ,J.-This case presents the question of the liability, if any, of a railroad company for failure to make
struetural changes to meet changing traffic conditions on the
highway deck of a bridge, which bridge is owned and operated
and which highway deck was used as a public highway under
the terms of an agreement with the public authorities.
Plaintiff sought damages for injuries sustained by him
when an autobus, in which he and other farm laborers were
riding, ran off the highway deck of the ''I'' Street bridge
over the Sacramento River at Sacramento and crashed to the
ground below. Plaintiff alleged negligence against defendant
railroad in the maintenance of the bridge and against defendant Al Ruiz in operation of the bus. Defendant Frank
King was sued as owner of the bus and as employer of the
driver Ruiz. The trial court found that the accident occurred
as the "proximate and contributing result" of negligent operation of the bus by the driver, as employee of defendant King,
and negligent maintenance of the overhead structure of the
bridge ; that defendant railroad was the owner and operator of
the bridge; that construction of the overhead or roadway portion of the bridge was controlled by an agreement dated
September 6, 1910, executed by the railroad and the counties
of Sacramento and Yolo, whereby the railroad granted to the
counties the ''right, easement and privilege of using the overhead structure and approaches thereto for highway purposes
and for the life of the bridge for railroad purposes'' ; that
the agreement also provided that the railroad would "repair,
police and operate" the overhead structure and approaches
thereto but that it ''did not include any obligation'' on the
part of the "Railroad Company, or any other defendant
herein, to do more than to maintain said structure according
to the design and plan under which said bridge was originally
built and that there was no obligation . . . to make structural
changes to meet changing traffic conditions." It was also
found that the overhead structure and approaches thereto
were part of the state highway system; that plaintiff was the
employee of defendant King and engaged in the course of
his employment when injured; and that both were subject
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to the Workmen's Compensation Act. From such findings the
court concluded that plaintiff's sole remedy against defendant
King was within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Accident
Commission, and that the court had no jurisdiction; and further, that plaintiff should take nothing by his complaint. Accordingly, judgment was entered in favor of all defendants.
Plaintiff appeals from that portion of the judgment which
decrees that he take nothing against the railroad.
The original construction of the bridge and overhead structure, as completed in 1912, is conceded to have been proper.
However, appellant claims that with the increased use of
motor vehicle travel, respondent was negligent in failing to
maintain an adequate guardrail and curbing along the edge
of the pavement on the overhead highway deck of the bridge.
At the time of the accident, September 6, 1947, the roadway
was equipped with an 8-inch curb and an iron railing, as
provided in the original specifications. But this is not a case
where the common-law principle of tort liability applies
against respondent incident to a duty to maintain the highway deck of the bridge in a reasonably safe condition for use
by the traveling public at its express or implied invitation.
(Comstock v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 157 Minn. 345 [196
N.W. 177] ; Calley v. Boston & ll!aine R. R., 93 N.H. 359 [42
A.2d 329, 159 A.L.R. 115] .) Rather the controlling factor
is the mentioned agreement of 1910 fixing the rights and
obligations of the parties thereto with regard to the bridge and
overhead structure ·vve have concluded that the trial court
properly construed the terms of said agreement as not imposing on respondent the obligation to make structural changes
on the highway deck of the bridge to conform to changing
traffic needs and modes of travel.
The 1910 agreement provided for respondent's construction
of a double track bridge, with an overhead structure for
highway purposes, connecting the counties of Yolo and Sacramento and extending over the Sacramento River. It recited that the new structure was to replace an existing bridge
and overhead span which had been used in part for highway purposes and which were then out of repair. The cost
of the new bridge was specified as $786,000, of which the
estimate for the overhead deck and approaches thereto was
$160,671. By the agreement respondent leased the overhead
deck to Sacramento County for a period from the completion
of the bridge until December 15, 1916, after which time said
county was to (and did) receive a grant of the "right, ease-
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ment and privilege of using the overhead structure and approaches thereto'' for the life of the bridge. For the portion
of the bridge located in Yolo County, respondent granted
an identical easement to that county, also continuing for the
life of the bridge. The enjoyment of such easement and
privilege of use was not to "be interfered with" by respondent unless the county was in default in some term of
the agreement. The agreement further provided that until
December 15, 1916 (the termination of the lease to Sacramento
County), respondent would "keep in repair, operate and
police at its own expense, the said bridge, including the floor
of the overhead structure and the walks and railings thereon"
but after said date, during the life of the bridge, it would
''keep in repair and operate all of said bridge, except the overhead structure and approaches thereto." To this point of
exception, the agreement continued: ''Whereas, it is recognized that after December 15th, 1916, the keeping in repair,
operation and policing of the overhead structure, and approaches thereto, is properly chargeable to the said Counties
of Sacramento and Yolo, and said Counties desire that the
said 'Company' should agree to keep in repair and operate
and police the same, as it is more convenient for the 'Company' to do so, Now, Therefore, the said 'Company' agrees
to keep in repair, operate and police the said overhead structure, and approaches thereto, after December 15th, 1916, and
during the life of said bridge for railroad purposes, and in
consideration thereof" Sacramento County was to pay $1,500
per year and Yolo County, $500 per year; and, "if for any
reason, any payment . . . shall not be made . . . said Company . . . shall not be further obligated to keep in repair,
or operate, or police said overhead structure, and the approaches thereto.''
It is plain from the agreement that the respective count iPs werr grantrcl an exr lnsive right of way or easement
over the highway fleck of the briilge. Admittedly the highway
deck and approaches tl1ereto were built according to the
agreed plans and specifications, and they were then in a
safe and proper condition for use of the existing traffic.
[1] Respondent, as owner of the c:ervient tenement, did not
become obligated by the mere grant of the easement to maintain the easement in a safe condition for the protection of
those using it at the invitation of the easement owners, the
two counties. (9 Cal.Jur., § 8, p. 954; Linton v. Miller &
Lux, lnc., 83 CaLApp. 481, 484 [257 P. 105) ; see, also, Rest.,
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Torts, § 349.) [2] The constructed curb and railing on
the highway deck of the bridge formed a part of the subject
matter of the easement, and it was not incumbent upon respondent to alter these structural features of the roadway
or substitute others therefor to accommodate the changing
needs of public travel according to future development, in
the absence of an agreement devolving such duty upon respondent as owner of the servient tenement. (28 C.J.S.
"Easements," § 72, p. 750; § 94, p. 773; Carson v. Jackson
Land&; Min. Co., 90 W.Va. 781 [111 S.E. 846, 847].)
By the agreement of 1910 respondent had the obligation
to "keep in repair, operate and police" the overhead structure of the bridge. The agreement recognized that after
the effective date of the easement to Sacramento County
(December 15, 1916, upon termination of its lease arrangement with respondent), such obligation was properly chargeable to the counties as owners of the easement (Crease v.
Jarrell, 65 Cal.App. 554, 559 [224 P. 762] ), but as a matter
of convenience, respondent was made responsible for the
performance of this work in return for an annual payment
by the counties. This contractual undertaking must be examined as fixed by the contracting parties.
[3] It does not appear that respondent's obligation to
"keep in repair, operate and police" the highway deck of
the bridge contemplated the making of structural changes
thereon. The word "repair" in its ordinary sense relates
to the preservation of property in its original condition, and
does not carry the connotation that a new thing should be
made or a distinct entity created. (76 C.J.S. p. 1169.) As was
said in Realty &; Rebuilding Co. v. Rea, 184 Cal. 565, at page
ri76 [194 P. 1024]: "To repair means to mend an old thing,
not to make a new thing; to restore to a sound state something' which has become partially dilapidated, not to create
something which has no existence." (See, also, Santa Cruz
Rock Paveme11t Co. v. Broderick, 113 Cal. 628, 633 r45 P.
8631.) Appellant cites Bosqui v. City of San Bernardino,
2 Ca1.2d 747 [43 P.2d 547], where the railroad's duty to
''keep in repair'' was likened to the ''duty to maintain.''
But under the facts there involved, no broader definition was
thereby contemplate([. There the duty "related to the struct nn• itself," a viaduct, including the "duty to repair or replae.e weakened or worn portions" thereof, and the railroad
>vas held liable when the viaduct was allowed to "fail or decline'' and injury was sustained as the result of certain
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splinters projecting from itR worn and dilapidated wooden
(mrbings. (P. 75R.) There the failure to repair was a failure
to keep the cnrbingf' in their. original condition. Consistent
with such definition of the word ''repair,'' respondent had the
duty to keep the overhead structure at the ''standard of
efficiency'' it had according to the design and plan under
which it waR originally constructed, but not to make structmal changes to meet developing exigencies of traffic over the
years. (See In re Morris Ave. Bridge, 105 Misc. 659 [174
N.Y.S. 682, 683).)
[4a] Moreover, the parties did not interpret their agreement as imposing upon respondent the duty to make structural
changes in the highway deck of the bridge. Respondent's
division engineer testified that, in his 30 years' experience
with respondent, he knew it to ''have at various times made
repairs to the overhead structure . . . when the railing becomes broken . . . [and J restore it to its original condition"
but the "railroad . . . . made no structural changes." The
counties acquiesced in this interpretation of the agreement
and never made "any demand" upon respondent "to alter the
nature of the construction or the construction features of the
bridge.'' He further testified that such ''structural changes
or alterations" as were made were done by the state, twice
with respondent's consent and once without. [5] The "construction given the contract by the acts and conduct of the
parties with knowledge of its terms, before any controversy
has arisen as to its meaning, is entitled to great weight and
will, when reasonable, be adopted and enforced by the courts."
(Woodbine v. Van Horn, 29 Cal.2d 95, 104 [173 P.2d 17];
Gillespie v. City of Los Angeles, 36 Cal.2d 553, 561 [225 P.2d
522] ; Trottier v. M. H. Golden Const1·uction Co., 105 Cal.App.
2d 511, 516 [233 P.2d 675].) [4b] Here the construction
placed by the parties upon their agreement is not only reasonable, but a contrary construction would not ref:lect the ordinary
meaning of the language used. ( Civ. Code, § 1644~)
[6] Nor do the words "operate and police" place upon
respondent the duty to make structural changes on the overhead structure. Built across the Sacramento River, the bridge
is a drawbridge constructed so as to allow the passage of river
navigation. Normally the word "operate" when used in
connection with machinery or something that moves, as here
the drawbridge, means to ''put in action and supervise the
working of," to "run." (67 C.J.S. p. 502; see Gallenkamp v.
Garvin Mach. Co., 91 App.Div. 141 [86 N.Y.S. 378, 384],
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179 N.Y. 588 [72 N.E. 1142J .)
Respondent's division
engineer testified that over the years of the agreement, respondent's operation of the bridge had been confined exclusively to ''operation of the draw span.'' Such procedure indicates the parties' practical construction of their agreement
in reference to respondent's operation of the mechanism vvhich
eontrolled the movable part of the bridge. As to the purport
of respondent's ''policing obligation,'' the same witness testified that it related to respondent's closing of the gates when
the bridge was about to open and stopping traffic before he
gates were closed; also sweeping and removing rubbish from
the upper deck. The construction the parties placed on their
agreement extending over some 3G years is entitled to great
weight in the solution of any difficulty as to the meaning of
the language used. (JJiitau v. Roddan, 149 Cal. 1, 14 [84 P.
145, 6 L.R.A.N.S. 275] ; Therrnalito hr. Dist. v. California
WaterS. Co., 108 Cal.App.2d 329, 341 [239 P.2d 109] .)
It is fair to assume that had the parties intended to impose the sweeping obligation on respondent to make such
structural changes in the highway deck of the bridge as would
keep it reasonably safe for ever changing traffic conditions,
some mention thereof would have been made in their agreement. But no such provision appears and respondent, in its
unconditional grant of the easement to the counties for use
of the highway deck, reserved no right to interfere therewith for the purpose of making alterations or structural improvements. Under the circumstances the parties presumably
intended the California law declaring the rights and obligations tlowing from the grant of an easement to be applicable.
[8] Section 806 of the Civil Code provides that the extent
of a servitude is determined by the terms of the grant, or the
nature of the enjoyment by whieh it was acquired; and it is
well settled that ''both parties have the right to insist that so
long as the easement is enjoyed it shall remain substantially
the same as it was at the time the right accrued, entirely regardless of the question as to the relative benefit and damage
that would ensue to the parties by reason of a change in the
mode and manner of its enjoyment.'' (Allen v. San Jose Land
d7 Water Co., 92 Cal. 138, 141 [28 P. 215, 1G L.R.A. 93]; see
Hannah v. Pogue, 23 Cal.2d 849, 854 [147 P.2d 572] .)
[9] The record shows that such structural changes as
were made on the overhead structure from time to time were
done by the state and at its expense. The first of such changes
was in pursuance of an agreement of March 23, 1934, to which
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the state, the counties and respondent were parties. Thereby
the state undertook to make all necessary changes in the over!J ead strncture-' 'said work consisting of widening of the
pavement for vehicular traffic, reconstruction of sidewalks,
shifting of railings and lighting standards, and shifting curbs
in locations shovvn" on the specifications-as would facilitate
its use as a (1etoue during the construction of the new "M:"
Street bridge. It was also agreed thereby that the state would
''maintain the roadway of [the J overhead structure and appt·oaehrs at its expense, and in the event conditions due to inerea;.;e<l traffie reqnire additional policing to properly maintain
and safegnard traffic during the period of detour State shall
assume the entire cost thereof.''
'!'his 19:34 agreement demonstrates that the state had knowledge of the ] 910 agreement between respondent and the
connties as to the natnre of the E'asement granted and secured
their consent before undertaking to alter the manner of its use
and enjoyment. ( Civ. Code, § 806.) Moreover, two subsequent structural changes were made on the overhead structure
b~- the state and at its Pxpense. Having knowledge of the 1910
agrePmPnt, the state would not have voluntarily undertaken
to make such structural improvements if any such duty were
imposed on the parties to the said agreement. Rather the
state's action coincided with its statutory duty in reference
to the roadway running across the overhead structure as constitnting a traversable state highway. (Stats. 1933, ch. 767,
§ 7.)
[10] Section 100 of the Streets and Highways Code,
enactecl in 19:35 and in effect at the time of the accident in
question, provided: ''The [state] department [of public
'vorh:s l shall haYe fu.ll possession and control of all State
highwa;'s. The department is authorized and directed . . . to
irn.prove and maintain snch highways as provided in this code .
. . . T1w departmrnt may f1o any act necessar11 or proper for
the constnwtion, hnpro'l'cment. maintenance or control of all
highways and properties which are under its control. . . . ''
(Emphasis added.) Section 27 of the same code defines maintenance to include "(h) The necessary provision for special
safety conveniences and devices'' and further provides: "The
degree ancl type of mm.ntenance for each highway . . . shall
be determined" by the state agency. Under these provisions
the state, not responitent, would have authority to make
structural changes in the highway deck of the bridge and
would be chargeable with the undertaking of appropriate
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safety measures pursuant to its maintenance of the state highway system. (Gillespie v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 36 CaL
2d 553, 557-558.)
In view of these observations, the trial court's exoneration of respondent from liability is fully sustained by the
record. Neither by express provision nor as practically construed by the parties did the controlling 1910 agreement impose upon respondent an obligation to make structural changes
on the highway deck of the bridge to conform with changing
traffic needs, but rather all changes of that character proceeded at the instance and cost of the state pursuant to its
statutory duty. Having neither obligation nor authority to
make structural changes in the highway deck of its bridge,
r0spondent is not chargeable with responsibility for the happening of the accident here involved.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, ,J., allll
Sehauer, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-The majority opm10n holds that since an
easement was granted by the railroad company to the counties to use the bridge for road purposes, the company was
under no obligation to keep the bridge in a safe condition.
The whole tenor of the 1910 agreement and other factors
points to at least joint control of the roadway part of the
bridge by the railroad company and the counties.
The 1910 agreement stated that it was made under statutory authority. (Stats. 1907, p. 982.) That statute authorizes agreements between counties and private persons for the
acquisition and maintenance of bridges. Such an agreement
shall provide for the "joint use" of a bridge by the parties
and it shall be referred to as a ''joint'' bridge. With that
statutory base the obvious purpose of the 1910 contract was
that the bridge was to be "jointly" used and hence "jointly"
owned and controlled by the railroad company and the counties.
The 1910 contract, after referring to the easement to be
granted to the counties, provides that the railroad company
(after 1916) shall, for a stated sum, "keep in repair and
, operate and police'' the road portion of the bridge. Why
was that undertaken by the company~ This question is answered by the contract as it states, immediately preceding
the covenant to repair and operate, as follows: "Whereas, it
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is recognized" (emphasis added) that after 1916, the upkeep is chargeable to the counties but the counties desire that
the railroad company should agree "to keep in repair and
operate the same, as it is more convenient for the [company1
to do so." (Emphasis added.) This clearly shows that the
railroad company should continue as before-have control of
the bridge including the roadway and be in charge of its
maintenance; that although the counties may, in a technical
sense, have an easement for a roadway over the bridge, the
railroad company still had joint control and obligated itself
to do anything the counties would be required to do with
reference to keeping the bridge safe.
This thought was further indicated by the 1934 contract
between the counties, state, and the railroad company, in
which the state was authorized to make some improvements
in the road part of the bridge. If the railroad company no
longer had any control or interest in the road part of the
bridge by reason of the easement granted to the counties, there
would have been no occasion for it to be a party to that contract and consent to the improvements. It is recited in that
contract that the railroad company and the counties are
willing to permit the state to make the improvements on
specified conditions however. The conditions are, among
others, that the work must be performed to the satisfaction
of the railroad company ; that during the time the bridge is
being used by the state for detour purposes the state shall
maintain the road portion at its expense, and if traffic conditions require additional policing during that time the
state shall furnish same, all of which indicates that the state
was assuming that which was the duty of the railroad company; and :finally that all the terms of the 1910 contract
shall remain in force, that is, shall become revitalized from
thenceforth, although the traffic conditions and requirements
to keep the bridge safe had vastly increased in 1934 from
those existing when the 1910 contract was made.
The only reasonable conclusion from these factors is that
the words "repair," "operate" and "police" were not used
in a narrow sense; that the railroad company retained at least
joint control of the road part of the bridge and was obligated to maintain it in a safe condition.
Reliance is placed by the majority on the testimony of the
railroad company's division engineer that the company had
made no structural changes in the road part of the bridge
for 30 years and the counties never made demand for any.
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The complete answer to this argument is that it does not
appear that the counties were apprised that any changes were
necessary.
The words ''operate'' and ''repair'' must be defined according to the context in which they were used. The thing
to be maintained was a roadway. The counties would be concerned with only one thing, namely, that the bridge be kept
safe for those who used it, the travelling public. "Operate"
means to have control of (State v. Thomason, 224 Iowa 499
[276 N.W. 619]; Booth v. State, 179 Ind. 405 [100 N.E. 563,
Ann.Cas. 1915D 987, L.R.A. 1915B 420]; Southern Ry. Co.
v. Flynt, 203 Ala. 65 [82 So. 25] ; Bosse v. Marye, 80 Cal.
App. 109 [250 P. 693]) and includes doing so safely. (McKim
v. City of Philadelphia, 217 Pa. 243 [66 A. 340].) "Torepair the roads in question means to make them over, not
necessarily exactly like they were before, nor in exact accord with the original plans, but, utilizing the work done in
constructing the roads originally under the original plans,
make them over with such material for resurfacing as experience and advance in the science of road building teach
will be the best and the most economical in the long run,
thereby giving the landowners value received for their investment.'' (Cowan v. Thompson, 178 Ark. 44 [9 S.W.2d
790, 792].) (Emphasis added.) The obligation to repair
was to run indefinitely in the future, thus contemplating that
future conditions must be considered in determining what
would be necessary to do to keep the road portion in repair.
Those conditions thus include changes in traffic conditions
and also methods of operation which may produce the necessity for extensive repairs. The obligation to make such repairs was placed on the railroad company by the 1910 agreement and continued in force until the happening of the accident here involved. Since the court found that the unsafe
condition of the roadway on the bridge was a proximate cause
of the accident, the liability of the railroad company was
established.
I would therefore reverse the judgment.

